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DOMESTIC BORROWING WITHOUT THE RATE OF INTEREST: 
GHARAR AND THE ORIGINS OF SUKUK  
 
In literature, Gharar is usually examined from the perspective of modern Islamic 
private finance. In this article, I will focus on gharar in public finance. As we will 
follow gharar across centuries, we will notice that we will inadvertently end up 
discussing the origins of sukuk as well. Thus, this paper aims at investigating both 
of these important topics. A main point of this paper is that sukuk is by no means a 
new invention and its roots go back to the 18th and possibly even to the 15th 
centuries. What we are witnessing currently is, therefore, a re-invention of an 
instrument practiced by Muslims centuries ago. 
 
Definition of Gharar: 
 
The word gharar comes from the Arabic root verb gharara/gharra meaning to 
expose oneself and one’s property to destruction without being aware of it. Thus, 
it has been argued, the most important element of gharar is deception and feeding 
the victim with false information, which disguises the truth, haqq.1  
 
Some jurists have also interpreted gharar as doubt over the existence of the 
subject matter of the contract. Al-Sarakhsi has defined gharar as any bargain in 
which the result and the legal consequences of it are hidden and unknown. Ibn 
Rushd considers a transaction as gharar if the buyer suffers a loss due to a lack of 
knowledge concerning either the price or the non-existence of the subject matter. 
The essence of concern about gharar has been best summarized by the Prophet: 
                                           
1 Buang, The Prohibition of Gharar, pp. 30-32. 
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“La darar wa-la dirar”, meaning that “there shall be no unfair loss, nor the 
causing of such loss”.2  
 
This may, at first, appear to be confusing, because bulk of the classical literature, 
particularly referring to business partnerships, emphasizes the importance of risk. 
It is also well-known that riba is prohibited primarily because instead of sharing, 
all the risks are transferred to the borrower. Thus, clearly, Islam cannot be against 
the concept of risk. What then has the Prophet meant with the above statement? 
This has been explained by Ibn Taymiah: 
 
“It is well-known that Allah and His Messenger did not prohibit every kind 
of risk. Nor all kinds of transactions that involve the possibility of gain or 
loss or neutrality are prohibited. What is prohibited among such kinds is 
eating wealth for nothing, even if there were no risk, not that risk as such is 
prohibited”3 
 
Once again, the emphasis is on risk-sharing. Indeed, what is prohibited is “eating 
wealth for nothing”. Thus we reach the conclusion that while in a transaction 
involving two or more partners, shared risks are permitted and constitute no 
gharar,risks unshared and imposed solely on one of the partners are not permitted 
and constitute gharar. This can be considered a corollary of the prohibition of 
riba. 
 
Al-Dhareer has identified 14 different gharar types.4 Two of these, “ignorance of 
the quantity of the object” and “contracting on a non-existent object” are the ones 
that are, particularly, relevant for this paper.  
                                           
2Sunusi, “Gharar”, pp. 87-100. 
3 al-Suwailem, “Objective Measure”, p. 601. 
4 Al-Dareer, Al-Gharar, p. 11. 
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Concerning the first, if an object is not in sight, knowledge of its quantity is a 
condition for its validity. As we will see, this has direct relevance for the history 
of Islamic public finance. 
 
Concerning the second, i.e., contracting on a non-existent object, there are non-
existent items whose sale implies no gharar because, the consequence of the sale 
is not hidden from view. For example, sale of things which are non-existent at the 
time of the contract but which are customarily certain to exist, or the sale of 
things which will come into existence in succession imply no gharar.  
 
Al-Dhareer has clarified the issue as follows: “every non-existent object whose 
future existence is uncertain must not be sold, and every non-existent object 
whose future existence is normally ascertainable, may be sold.”5 The term “future 
existence normally ascertainable” is of crucial importance here.  
 
Necessity (maslaha)  is considered to be of paramount importance in determining 
whether a contract is a “gharar” contract.6 Therefore, it has been concluded that it 
is the Lawgiver’s justice and mercy to permit contracts that people need even if 
they contain “gharar”.7 
 
After this introduction, we will now focus on the question as to what extent a 
powerful Islamic state in the past dealt with the problem of gharar while 
financing itself. 
 
Tax Collection: 
                                           
5 Ibid. p. 32. 
6 This is based upon the verse “He made no hardship for you V:157; Ibid., p. 49. 
7 Ibid., p. 49.  
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Referred to in literature as tax-farming, the most widespread form of Ottoman 
tax collection during much of the 15th-17th centuries was the iltizam. While the 
origins of this system was known as iqta’ and can be traced to the earliest 
periods of Islam, it appears to have extended in the following centuries. Indeed 
iqta’ and its derivatives were widespread and found application from the 
Balkans to India.8  
 
This was a method of tax collection through public auctions and worked as 
follows: In this system, the state delegated its right to collect taxes to an 
entrepreneur. Thus, taxes were actually collected by the private enterprise. The 
state chose the entrepreneur who would collect taxes on its behalf through 
competitive public auctions. The Ottoman tax collector, the mültezim, was 
basically a risk taker, an entrepreneur. He competed with others to be appointed 
as the designated tax-farmer. The competition was in the form of commitments. 
The entrepreneur who committed himself to pay the highest amount to the state 
was appointed as the mültezim to a specific tax-source, muqata’a. This 
authorized him to collect taxes from this tax source for a given period, usually 
from a year to three years.  
 
Whenever a tax-farmer committed himself to collect a certain amount of taxes 
from a tax source and promised to pay the state a certain amount, he took a 
calculated risk based upon previous records and experience. Consider, for 
instance, collection of customs from a given port. The tax-farmer would base his 
decision to make his bid on the estimated amount of numbers of ships that 
would use the port. Because, the number of ships, the amount of goods they will 
                                           
8 See on this, Morimoto, Fiscal Administration of Egypt; Cizakca, A Comparative Evolution, 
pp. 136-138. 
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bring and the amount of customs revenue to be collected are not known, there 
appears to be gharar here. If despite this uncertainty, this institution has been 
allowed to operate for centuries in various Islamic societies, this was probably 
based upon the two criteria we have mentioned above. 
 
First, consider the sale of things which are non-existent at the time of the 
contract but which are customarily certain to exist, or the sale of things which 
will come into existence in succession. Obviously, the piecemeal arrival of ships 
to the port throughout the year means a gradual “coming into existence in 
succession”. This pertains to Al-Dareer’s conclusion that “every non-existent 
object whose future existence is normally ascertainable, may be sold”. There is 
no doubt that while the future existence of the amount of goods to be unloaded 
and taxed in the port continued to be uncertain, based upon customary previous 
experience, “future existence was normally ascertainable”.  
 
The second criterion pertains to necessity. We have noted above that most 
mazhabs permit contracts on account of necessity even though they may bear the 
element of gharar. The necessity in this case was due to the fact that all early 
modern states collected their revenues (taxes) in kind and had difficulty 
converting these to cash. This conversion was made by entrepreneurs through 
the system of tax-farming. For all pre-modern states, in the Islamic world as 
well as the west, this conversion was vitally important.9 
 
We can therefore conclude that based upon this criterion, necessity, tax-farming 
was permitted in most Islamic states throughout history. We will now focus on 
how the system of tax-farming evolved within the framework of Ottoman public 
                                           
9 Hicks, A Theory, ch. 6. 
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finance. This institutional evolution will also inform us how the nature of gharar 
has changed over time as well.  
 
Evolution of Ottoman Tax-farming: 
 
Tax-farming played a very important role in Ottoman public finance. Indeed, in 
the year 1527, as much as 80 percent of the Egyptian revenues were collected 
through the iltizam system.10  
 
The gharar element appears to have emerged in two different types in this 
system. First, at the time of the auctions when the mültezim committed himself, 
the amount of revenue to be collected from the tax-source was not known. 
Second, the tenure of the tax-farmer was also not known. This meant that 
although the intended duration of his contract may have been, say, three  years, 
the actual duration may have been much less, say a year only. This is because, 
the state did not commit itself to any specific duration and was free to give the 
tax-farm to another tax-farmer at any time. Thus, the tax-farmer could never be 
sure to collect the amount he envisaged both because of the uncertainty of 
supply and because of the uncertainty of his own tenure.11  
 
These uncertainties, i.e., gharar elements of the two types, eventually started to 
have impact and undesirable consequences for the Ottoman public finance began 
to emerge. To start with, tax-farmers facing uncertain tenures and wishing to 
start making profits as soon as possible, felt the need to maximize revenue at the 
shortest possible time. This meant that producers were harassed by these tax-
                                           
10 Çizakça, Comparative Evolution, ch. V. 
 
11 If the tax-farm was given to another mültezim, the first tax-farmer was naturally 
reimbursed. 
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farmers. Moreover, over-shadowed by such gharar, tax-farmers simply did not 
make any investments to improve the productivity of the tax-source they were 
controlling. But it was not only the tax-farmers, the state was also interested in 
obtaining the maximum revenue at the shortest possible time. These 
developments eventually led to certain improvements in the system. Each such 
improvement played a role in the evolution of the Ottoman public finance.  
 
To start with, as the state felt an ever increasing urgency to collect its revenue at 
the shortest possible time, it began to demand from the tax-farmers to pay their 
commitments up-front. This increased the gharar element even further. 
Meanwhile, commitments were also continuously increasing. Risks as well as  
capital committed rapidly surpassed the means of single entrepreneurs and 
partnerships had to be formed. Tax-farms which were particularly lucrative 
could only be obtained by paying the state the promised amount in cash and 
upfront. But when no tax-farmers capable of paying upfront could be found, the 
state relented and allowed them to pay in instalments.  
 
Payment in installments led to another problem – this time it was the state which 
was facing gharar. After all, the state had firm commitments to pay its military 
and wanted to make sure that the committed amount would actually be paid. 
Indeed, payments to the military constituted bulk of the state expenditure.12 To 
ensure payment, it demanded surety from tax-farmers. A kefil , a person who 
agreed to stand as surety for the tax-farmer, had to be introduced.  
 
It has been argued that since no one would normally assume the risks of being 
surety without something in return, the kefil must have been actually the silent 
                                           
12 Other vital services such as health, education etc., were financed, organized and maintained 
by the waqf system. See on this, Çizakça, Philanthropic Foundations. 
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partner, rab al-mal, of the tax-farming partnership.13 Since archival evidence 
does not give evidence of a uniform procedure regarding the kefils of failed tax-
farming partnerships, this inconsistency has been explained by the changing 
liability structures of classical Islamic partnerships. Put differently, it has been 
argued that while kefils of mudaraba type tax-farm partnerships would only be 
held responsible to pay the amount of their initial investment (limited liability), 
kefils of the mufawada type partnerships assumed an unlimited liability and 
could be subject to confiscation even imprisonment.14  
 
In view of these relative liabilities, it seems reasonable to assume that while the 
kefils must have preferred to associate themselves through mudaraba, the state 
must have preferred tax-farmers associated through mufawada. These 
arguments, which should be considered as hypotheses, can only be vindicated by 
analyzing actual contracts between tax-farmers and their kefils, a task not yet 
attempted.15 
 
The kafala, surety, system just described, does not appear to have provided 
sufficiently reliable revenue to the state. This is only natural, for what the state 
could collect from the economy always depended on the economic conjuncture, 
which fluctuated. While competition among the tax-farmers in times of rapid 
economic growth led to ever increasing revenues (auction prices) from the tax-
farms, in times of stagnation, revenues fell. Consequently, despite the kafala, the 
uncertainty the state faced was such that it decided to shift the entire uncertainty 
upon the shoulders of the tax-farmers and their partners, thus increasing the 
gharar further.  
                                           
13 Çizakça, A Comparative Evolution, ch. V. 
14 Ibid., p. 148. 
15 It is possible to do this research among the 11,000 volumes of Istanbul Ottoman Court 
Registers, held in the office of the Mufti of Istanbul. 
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The Malikane System: 
 
This happened when the Ottoman state unexpectedly faced a situation that 
threatened its very survival. The crisis came with the second siege of Vienna in 
1683, when a long war ensued that lasted until 1699. This war resulted with 
significant territorial loss for the first time.16 Huge budget deficits were the 
result and there was an urgent need to increase revenue substantially at the 
shortest possible time. The solution was found in the Malikane system 
introduced in 1695.  
 
The new system reflects the ever increasing risk aversion of the state and what it 
was prepared to do to mitigate its risks. In a nut shell, malikâne transferred to 
the entrepreneurs, malikânecis, the right to collect taxes from a given tax-farm 
for a life time, in return for a large lump sum payment made upfront, muajjalah, 
combined with more modest and fixed annual payments called, mal. The state 
calculated a minimum rate for the muajjalah as, two to ten times the annual 
average estimated profit of the tax-source. These calculated amounts were then 
displayed at the doors of the Finance Ministry in Istanbul. The candidates then 
came and registered the actual muajjalah amounts they were prepared to pay. 
The highest bidder obtained the right to collect taxes from a certain tax-source 
for the rest of his life.  
 
It will be argued here that the gharar element must have reached to new heights 
in this system. This is because, the malikânecis were now asked to pay a very 
large amount upfront on the assumption that they would be able to cover their 
                                           
16 From 1300 to 1683 the Ottoman state normally expanded and did not suffer any major loss 
of territory. The only exception was the defeat suffered in 1402, when Tamerlane attacked 
Anatolia – a war between Turks. 
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expenses in the future. There were two different uncertainties here. First, the 
entrepreneurs had to guess how much taxes they would be able to collect, which 
would be a function of the economic conjuncture in the future and second, they 
would have to assume that they would live, at least, a certain amount of years. 
This was particularly important because, malikâne did not entail a transfer of 
property rights to the entrepreneur – it was made clear that the tax-farm could 
not be inherited by his offspring (s) and that it would be taken away from his 
family upon his death.17 These risks were somewhat mitigated by the possibility 
of selling the malikâne to third persons. But such sales were subject to a tax of 
ten percent of the original muajjalah amount paid.  
 
The malikânecis could keep their tax-farms as long as they paid regularly the 
annuities, mal. Thus, the state was once again minimizing its risks. Indeed, if a 
malikâneci failed to pay the annuity, he would loose his tax-farm. Consequently, 
the very large muajjalah paid upfront constituted a strong surety for the regular 
payment of the annuities.  
 
In short, in the malikâne system the risk aversion of the Ottoman state had 
reached to the maximum and all the risks were transferred to the tax-farming 
entrepreneurs, who were primarily members of the military class, the so-called 
askerî. In return for this, the military/entrepreneurs were granted near complete 
property rights for as long as they lived. It has been argued that the malikâne 
                                           
17 It will be argued here that if the tax-farm had been obtained by several tax-farmers in a 
partnership, the termination of the malikane would depend on the number of partners. If the 
partnership comprised one or two partners, death of one of them would lead to the termination 
of the partnership and the malikane would be taken over by the state. If, however, the 
partnership comprized three or more partners, the malikane would continue. This is a 
hypothesis inferred from the partnership law and needs to be tested within the framework of 
the malikane system. For further details see; M. Çizakça and M. Kenanoğlu, “Ottoman 
Merchants”. 
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system paved for members of the Ottoman askerî class the way towards full 
private ownership.18  
 
The malikâne system achieved the following: First, the massive budget deficits 
were minimized and in 1701 a substantial budget surplus was achieved.19 
Second, it improved substantially the reliability of tax collection. Indeed, in the 
earlier iltizam system in times of depression, some tax-farms remained unsold – 
a situation which must have led to a considerable loss of revenue for the state. 
This problem was solved by the malikâne system by selling the tax-source on a 
life-term basis. Indeed, once sold this way, the state no longer had to worry 
about selling it at the next auction. The next auction did not take place until the 
malikâneci died. 
 
The Esham: 
 
About 80 years after the establishment of the malikâne system and despite the 
improvements achieved in its finances, the Ottoman Caliphate faced another 
disaster. In the year 1774, its armies were defeated, this time by the Russians, 
and a hefty war indemnity had to be paid. The situation demanded an urgent 
reform of the public finances. The solution was found in the introduction of a 
new system called, esham. 
 
In comparison to malikâne, whereby the entire stream of revenue of a tax-farm 
was auctioned off to the highest bidder for his life-time, in esham, the annual 
revenue of a tax-farm was divided into equal shares and each share was sold off. 
                                           
18 Çizakça, Comparative Evolution, pp. 160-163. While civilians enjoyed property rights, as 
embodied in Islamic law, members of the askerî class did not. This progress was arrested in 
1775 with the introduction of the esham system, when tax-farms came to be managed directly 
by the state. 
19 Genç, “Malikane Sistemi”, p. 236. 
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Once bought, the purchaser of a share, sehm, continued to receive the same 
annual revenue for his life–time.  
  
The initial steps to establish the new system appear to have been taken in 1758, 
when the Ottoman state decided to take over one of the most lucrative tax-farms 
in the empire, the Tobocco Customs of Istanbul.20 This tax-farm had already 
been sold on life-term basis to a group of malikânecis.  So the state paid back to 
these people their original investments and evicted them. After taking over the 
tax-farm, it was soon noticed that the tax-farm generated an annual profit of one 
million gruş. In the year 1775, it was decided to apply a new method. This 
meant that the management of the tax-farm would not anymore be given to an 
entrepreneur. Instead, it was going to be managed by the state and the annual 
profit was going to be divided into equal shares and each one of these shares 
was going to be sold on life term basis. Careful calculations had indicated that 
the tax-farm would definitively generate at least 400,000 gruş profit annually. 
This figure was reached after deducting all expenses from the gross profit of one 
million gruş mentioned above. It was decided to divide this net profit figure into 
160 shares. Thus each share was able to generate 2,500 gruş net annual profit. 
Shares were offered for sale from April 1775 on. The price of each share, known 
as the muaccele as in the previous system, was determined to be 12,500 gruş. 
This meant that if all the shares were sold off, the treasury would receive two 
million gruş.  
 
                                           
20 Yavuz Cezar, Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim 
Dönemi (Istanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1986), s. 81. 
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As a matter of fact, all the shares were sold. This was probably facilitated by the 
fact that the returns were guaranteed by the state21 and the shares were divided 
into smaller fractions. Successful marketing of esham shares led to the extension 
of the new system. This was done by incorporating ever more tax-farms into the 
system.  
 
The fact that the state guaranteed a fixed return to esham owners did not make 
these shares usurious. This is because there were uncertainties. But since these 
uncertainties were shared between the state and the investor, they did not 
constitute gharar. To start with, the uncertainty of the investor: although he was 
guaranteed fixed annual returns, he could never be sure if he could recuperate 
his investment. Put differently, the investor could never know if he could live 
long enough so as to collect a total stream of annual revenues exceeding his 
initial investment. His risk was in the form of a short lifespan preventing him 
from collecting sufficient annuities to recuperate his total outlay. But this did not 
constitute a gharar situation because the state was also facing uncertainties. The 
uncertainty of the state was in the form of the unknown number of years that it 
would have to pay the annuities. If the esham share holders in toto enjoyed long 
lifespans, the total amount of annuities the state would have to pay would 
exceed the total amount of revenue it collected from the sale of esham. By the 
same token, the lifespan uncertainty eliminated riba despite the fact that esham 
holders received guaranteed annuities. It should be added that the state did not 
commit itself to redeem the esham shares at a predetermined date. 
 
Esham As the Origin of Sukuk - Securitization: 
 
                                           
21 The state guaranteed a minimum return per share. If the aggregate profit of a tax-farm 
unexpectedly increased, then the state issued new esham shares and sold them to the public. I 
owe this point to Mehmet Genç. 
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Since modern sukuk  are defined as “certificates of beneficial ownership rights 
in a pool of underlying assets…, which do not represent true ownership, but a 
right to returns for sukuk-holders ”,22 can we consider the Ottoman esham as the 
forerunner of sukuk ? To start with, it is well known that every modern sukuk 
contains two distinct elements: generation of revenue and securitization of this 
revenue. The Ottoman esham did not contain the first element since it was based 
upon a ready source of revenue that belonged to the state. It was therefore 
merely a system of securitization of this already existing stream of revenue. The 
very first23 Islamic securitization, therefore, took place in 1775 when the 
Ottoman state divided, ex ante, its expected revenue of 400,000 gruş from the 
tobacco customs of Istanbul into 160 equal shares and sold each share at a price 
of 12,500 gruş. This is clearly a process of securitization of the expected 
revenue. In this process, revenue generation was not needed as the whole 
enterprise was based upon an already existing source of revenue.  
 
Process of Revenue Generation (Cash Waqfs): 
 
For the origins of the process of revenue generation in modern sukuk, we need to 
go back to the Ottoman cash waqfs. This special waqf form has a long history 
and goes back at least to the fifteenth century. What made these waqfs special 
                                           
22 Natalie Schoon, “Basel II and Sukuk”, p. 114. The full definition is as follows: “certificates 
of beneficial ownership rights in a pool of underlying assets, which either allow for the 
underlying assets to be considered as collateral (asset-backed sukuk) or not (asset-based 
sukuk). A specific form of Ottoman cash waqfs to be examined below, can be considered as 
asset-backed sukuk, since they secured the tenant’s property as collateral until he paid off his 
debt. See also; Kuwait Finance House, “Introduction”, p. lvii. 
 
23 Historians usually try to avoid calling something “the very first”. Indeed, it is perfectly 
possible that future research may reveal earlier examples. This does not, however, change the 
fact that within the limits of our existing knowledge, esham constituted the very first Islamic 
securitization. 
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was the fact that they were established with cash capital and had to invest this 
capital in order to finance the charity for which they had been established.24 If 
we carefully examine the process of investing the endowed capital of an 
Ottoman cash waqf, we discover the very essence of the modern sukuk al-ijarah. 
 
A typical Ottoman cash waqf invested its endowed capital by a process called 
istiglal. This involved a sale-lease back-repurchase transaction and worked as 
follows: a borrower requesting to borrow a certain amount, offered to sell his 
house to the waqf for that amount. The waqf agreed to purchase it and paid the 
amount to the borrower. The borrower, then, requested to stay on in his house 
although it had now become the property of the waqf. His request was accepted 
in return for a rent and the borrower thus became a tenant of the waqf. After a 
certain amount of time, usually, a year, the tenant paid back to the waqf the price 
of the house (or the amount borrowed) and repurchased his property.  In short, 
this was a sale-lease back-repurchase transaction, which we observe clearly in 
all sukuk al-ijarah transactions.25  
 
Waqfs and the SPVs: 
 
Finally, we must note another remarkable phenomenon: the SPVs observed in 
all modern sukuk operations, bear all the basic characteristics of classical Islamic 
waqfs. This is because, in conventional securitizations, an originator will create 
a trust whereby legal title of an asset is held by a trustee for the benefit of the 
beneficiary. The issuer, SPV, will issue certificates to investors and the proceeds 
of this issuance are invested in assets that are held on trust for the sukuk holders. 
                                           
24 Çizakça, A History of Philanthropic Foundations. 
25 Naturally, there were other similar methods as well, where the tenant was simply requested 
to submit his house as collateral for the capital he borrowed. See; Çizakça, Comparative 
Evolution, pp. 131-134. 
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Moreover, the assets held by a trustee do not form part of his own estate. The 
trustee is merely authorized to keep the assets by the powers given to him by the 
trust deed. The trustee is not at liberty to sell the sukuk assets.26  
 
This entire description of the modus operandi of a modern sukuk and its SPV fit 
in perfectly well within the framework of a classical Islamic waqf. Consider the 
following: 
1. “an originator will create a trust whereby legal title of an asset is held by a 
trustee for the benefit of the beneficiary”. Simply replace the words, 
“originator”,  “trust” and “trustee” with “waqif”, “waqf” and “mutawalli”, 
then you have waqf. A “mutawalli” does exactly as described: he keeps 
the assets of a waqf created by an originator “waqif” for the benefit of a 
beneficiary. 
2.  “The issuer, SPV, will issue certificates to investors and the proceeds of 
this issuance are invested in assets that are held on trust for the sukuk 
holders”. This refers to securitization, which we have observed for the 
first time in 1774 (esham). But the proceeds are held on trust for the sukuk 
holders. Assets held by the trustee do not form part of his own estate. The 
trustee is merely authorized to keep the assets by the powers given to him 
by the trust deed. The trustee is not at liberty to sell the sukuk assets. This 
is clearly what the “mutawalli” does. He keeps the assets of the waqf in 
trust.  
 
This remarkable similarity between the SPVs of a modern sukuk and waqfs 
should not surprise us. This is because, the modern SPVs are established as 
common law trusts. But the English trusts were originally borrowed from the 
Islamic world during the crusades. Indeed, Monica Gaudiosi has shown that 
                                           
26 Rahail Ali, “Legal Certainty”, p. 95. 
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even the Merton College of Oxford University was founded as a waqf in the 
year 1264.27 Thus, we are talking about institutional borrowing in two cycles: 
waqfs borrowed by the English in the 13th century, trusts borrowed from the 
English common law by Islamic financial engineers while designing the modern 
sukuk. The institutional similarities we have observed are therefore only to be 
expected. 
 
Conclusion: 
Islamic public finance, more specifically, the Ottoman tax-farming contracts, 
had many uncertainties. Notwithstanding this, they were not considered as 
gharar contracts and were permitted. While we do not yet have definitive 
evidence explaining why they have been permitted, we can surmise that the 
permission was probably based primarily on three points: first, necessity, 
maslaha. Second, the argument “the revenue coming into existence in 
succession was normally ascertainable”. Third, the fact that uncertainties and 
risks were effectively shared between the entrepreneurs and the state. When the 
Ottoman state wanted to reduce its risks to a minimum and shift bulk of them to 
the military/entrepreneurs, it had to improve property rights of the latter in 
compensation.  
 
Although permitted, tax-farming contracts bearing gharar elements, had 
negative consequences in the long run. Much of the evolution of Ottoman public 
finance can be explained by the attempts to correct for these consequences. The 
final stage of this evolution led to the birth of the esham system.  
 
In all probability, esham constitutes the very first securitization of state owned 
assets in Islamic economic history. It can therefore be considered as one of the 
                                           
27 Çizakça, Philanthropic Foundations (Based upon Gaudiosi). 
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two sources of the modern sukuk. The other pertinent source (with respect to 
revenue generation) were the waqfs. While the modern SPVs have all the basic 
characteristics of classical waqfs, the sale/lease back/repurchase transactions of 
the modern sukuk al-ijarah have their genesis in the Ottoman cash waqfs. 
 
We should therefore be aware that many modern financial instruments which we 
think we are inventing, have actually been invented centuries ago. This is a 
humbling observation, which invites us to be more respectful of our own past 
and civilization. The lack of respect becomes particularly annoying when 
Muslim financial engineers borrow modern instruments of finance from England 
without realising that the English had borrowed them from us about eight 
centuries ago. The situation borders on the ridiculous when the same engineers 
complain that they cannot apply these “common law” institutions in Islamic 
countries dominated by the French civil law.28 I have a strong feeling that if, 
instead of trying to deal with the complexities of the British and French laws, 
the same engineers simply focused on modernizing Islamic financial institutions 
of the past, they would discover a substantial short cut. But for that they need a 
sea change in their attitudes, which should start with having more respect for 
their own civilization. 
 
 
                                           
28 Rahail Ali, “Legal Certainty”, p. 105. 
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